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Abstract
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the
characteristics of the players are unobservable to the analyst. We allow for a wide class of
distributions of unobserved heterogeneity, subject only to a separability assumption that
generalizes Choo and Siow (2006). We first show that the stable matching maximizes a social
gain function that trades o↵ exploiting complementarities in observable characteristic sand
matching on unobserved characteristics. We use this result to derive simple closed-form
formulæ that identify the joint surplus in every possible match and the equilibrium utilities
of all participants, given any known distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. If transfers
are observed, then the pre-transfer utilities of both partners are also identified. We discuss
computational issues and provide an algorithm that is extremely e cient in important
instances. Finally, we present two estimators of the joint surplus and we revisit Choo and
Siow’s empirical application to illustrate the potential of our more general approach.
Keywords: matching, marriage, assignment, hedonic prices.
JEL codes: C78, D61, C13.
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Becker (1973), many economists have modeled the mar-
riage market as a matching problem in which each potential match generates a marital
surplus. Assuming utility is transferable, the distributions of tastes and of desirable charac-
teristics determine equilibrium shadow prices, which in turn explain how partners share the
marital surplus in any realized match. This insight is not specific to the marriage market: it
characterizes the “assignment game” of Shapley and Shubik (1972), i.e. models of matching
with transferable utilities. These models have also been applied to competitive equilibrium
in good markets with hedonic pricing (Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim, 2010), to trade
(e.g. Costinot-Vogel 2014) and to the labour market (Tervio¨, 2008 and Gabaix and Landier,
2008.) Our results can be used in all of these contexts; but for concreteness, we often refer
to partners as “men” and “women” in the exposition of the main results.
While Becker presented the general theory, he focused on the special case in which the
types of the partners are one-dimensional and are complementary in producing surplus. As is
well-known, the socially optimal matches then exhibit positive assortative matching : higher
types pair up with higher types. Moreover, the resulting configuration is stable, it is in the
core of the corresponding matching game, and it can be e ciently implemented by a simple
sorting procedure. This sorting result is both simple and powerful; but its implications
are also at variance with the data, in which matches are observed between partners with
quite di↵erent characteristics. To account for a wider variety of matching patterns, one
solution consists in allowing the matching surplus to incorporate latent characteristics—
heterogeneity that is unobserved by the analyst. Choo and Siow (2006) have shown how it
can be done in a way that yields a highly tractable model in large populations, provided
that the unobserved heterogeneities enter the marital surplus quasi-additively and that they
are distributed as standard type I extreme value terms. They used their model to evaluate
the e↵ect of the legalization of abortion on gains to marriage; and Siow and Choo (2006)
applied it to Canadian data to measure the impact of demographic changes. It has also
been used to study increasing returns in marriage markets (Botticini and Siow, 2008), to
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compare the preference for marriage versus cohabitation (Mourifie´ and Siow, 2014) and, in
a heteroskedastic version, to estimate the changes in the returns to education on the US
marriage market (Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss, 2015.)
We revisit here the theory of matching with transferable utilities in the light of Choo
and Siow’s insights. Three assumptions underlie their contribution: latent variables do
not mutually interact in producing matching surplus, they are distributed as iid type I
extreme values, and populations are large. We maintain the first assumption, which we
call “separability”, and the last one which is innocuous in many applications. Choo and
Siow’s distributional assumption, on the other hand, is very special; it generates a multi-
nomial logit model that has unappealing restrictions on cross-elasticities. We first show
that this distributional assumption can be completely dispensed with. We prove that the
optimal matching in our generalized setting maximizes the sum of a term that describes
matching on the observables and a generalized entropic term that describes matching on
the unobservables. While the first term tends to match partners with complementary ob-
served characteristics, the second one pulls towards randomly assigning partners to each
other. The social gain from any matching pattern trades o↵ between these two terms. In
particular, when unobserved heterogeneity is distributed as in Choo and Siow (2006), the
generalized entropy is simply the usual entropy measure.
The maximization of this social surplus function has very straightforward consequences
in terms of identification, both when equilibrium transfers are observed and when they
are not. In fact, joint surplus and expected utilities can be obtained from derivatives of
the terms that constitute generalized entropy; and that in turn is a function of observed
matching probabilities. Moreover, if equilibrium transfers are observed, then we also identify
the pre-transfer utilities on both sides of the market. In independent work, Decker et al.
(2012) proved the uniqueness of the equilibrium and analyzed its properties in the Choo
and Siow multinomial logit framework. We show that most of their comparative statics
results in fact hold beyond the logit framework, and can be used as a testable prediction of
all separable models. We also show how to derive testable predictions that are specific to a
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given specification.
Our first conclusion thus is that the most important structural implications of the Choo-
Siow model hold under much more plausible assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity.
Our second contribution is to delineate an empirical approach to parametric estimation in
this class of models. Our nonparametric identification results rely on the strong assumption
that the distribution of the unobservables is known, while in practice the analyst will want to
estimate its parameters; at the same time our results imply that the matching surplus cannot
be simultaneously estimated with the distribution of the unobservable because there would
be more parameters than cells in the data matrix. This suggests using a smaller number
of parameters for the match surpluses. Maximum likelihood estimation is thus a natural
recourse, which we investigate below. In practice, since evaluating the likelihood requires
solving for the optimal matching, computational considerations loom large in matching
models. We provide an e cient algorithm that maximizes the social surplus and computes
the optimal matching, as well as the expected utilities in equilibrium. To do this, we
adapt the Iterative Projection Fitting Procedure (known to some economists as RAS) to
the structure of this problem, and we show that it is very stable and e cient. We discuss
an alternative to the maximum likelihood, a simple moment matching estimator based on
minimizing a generalized entropy among the matching distributions which fit a number of
moments. This second estimator also provides a very simple semi-parametric specification
test.
Our third contribution is to revisit the original Choo and Siow 2006 study of the e↵ect
of the legalization of abortion on marriage outcomes in the US, making use of the new
possibilities allowed by our extended framework. We estimate three di↵erent specifications;
for each of them, we evaluate the impact of Roe vs Wade on expected gains from marriage;
and we also test the performance of each estimated model out of sample. We find that
Choo and Siow’s “problematic finding” of more negative e↵ects for men than for women is
sensitive to the specification. One of our test models gives much more reasonable e↵ects;
it also behaves better out of sample. While these findings are of course specific to this
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particular application, they illustrate that our approach is both practical and fruitful.
There are other approaches to estimating matching models with unobserved hetero-
geneity; see the handbook chapter by Graham (2011, 2013). For markets with transferable
utility, Fox (2010) has proposed pooling data across many similar markets and relying on
a “rank-order property”: this assumes that given the characteristics of the populations of
men and women, a given matching is more likely than another when it produces a higher
expected surplus. Fox (2011) and Bajari and Fox (2013) applied this approach to the car
industry and to spectrum auctions. More recently, Fox and Yang (2012) focus on identi-
fying the complementarity between unobservable characteristics. A recent contribution by
Menzel (2014) investigates large markets with non-transferable utility, and Aggarwal 2014
estimates matching in the US medical resident program.
Section 1 sets up the model and the notation. We prove our main results in Section 2,
and we specialize them to leading examples in Section 3. Our results open the way to new
and richer specifications; Section 4 explains how to estimate them using maximum likelihood
estimation, and how to use various restrictions to identify the underlying parameter. We
also show there that a moment-based estimator is an excellent low-cost alternative in a
restricted but useful model. Section 6 applies several instances of separable models to
Choo and Siow’s data. Finally, we present in Section 5 our IPFP algorithm, which greatly
accelerates computations in important cases.
Our arguments use tools from convex analysis as well as optimal transportation. We
have tried to keep the exposition intuitive in the body of the paper; all proofs can be found
in Appendix A, to which we direct interested readers.
1 The Assignment Problem with Unobserved Heterogeneity
We study in this paper a bipartite, one-to-one matching market with transferable utility.
We maintain throughout some of the basic assumptions of Choo and Siow (2006): utility
transfers between partners are unconstrained, matching is frictionless, and there is no asym-
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metric information among potential partners. We call the partners “men” and “women”,
but our results are clearly not restricted to the marriage market.
Men are denoted by i 2 I and women by j 2 J . A matching µ˜ = (µ˜ij) is a matrix such
that µ˜ij = 1 if man i and woman j are matched, 0 otherwise. A matching is feasible if for
every i and j, X
k2J




with equality for individuals who are married. Single individuals are “matched with 0”:
µ˜i0 = 1 or µ˜0j = 1. For completeness, we should add the requirement that µ˜ij is either 0
or 1. However it is known (see e.g. Shapley and Shubik, 1972) that this integrality constraint
is not binding, and we will omit it.
A hypothetical match between man i and woman j allows them to share a total utility
 ˜ij ; the division of this total utility1 between them is done through utility transfers whose
value is determined in equilibrium. Singles get utilities  ˜i0,  ˜0j . Following Gale and Shapley
(1962) for matching with non-transferable utility, we focus on the set of stable matchings.
A feasible matching is stable if there exists a division of the surplus in each realized match
that makes it impossible for any man k and woman l to both achieve strictly higher utility
by pairing up together, and for any agent to achieve higher utility by being single. More
formally, let u˜i denote the utility man i gets in his current match; denote v˜j the utility of
woman j. Then by definition u˜i + v˜j =  ˜ij if they are matched, that is if µ˜ij > 0; and
u˜i =  ˜i0 (resp. v˜j =  ˜0j) if i (resp. j) is single. Stability requires that for every man k and
woman l, u˜k    ˜k0 and v˜l    ˜0l, and u˜k + v˜l    ˜kl for any potential match (k, l).
Finally, a competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of prices u˜i and v˜j and a feasible
matching µ˜ such that











1Like most of the matching literature, we assume throughout that partners interact e ciently; del Boca
and Flinn (2014) find empirical support for this assumption.
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Shapley and Shubik showed that the set of stable matchings coincides with the set of
competitive equilibria (and with the core of the assignment game); and that moreover, any











over all feasible matchings ⌫˜. The set of stable matchings is generically a singleton; on the
other hand, the set of prices u˜i and v˜j (or, equivalently, the division of the surplus into
u˜i and v˜j) that support it is a product of intervals. This discrete setting was extended by
Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992) to a continuum of agents.
1.1 Observable characteristics
Any empirical application of this framework must start by acknowledging that the analyst
only observes some of the payo↵-relevant characteristics that determine the surplus matrix
 ˜. Following Choo and Siow, we assume that she can only observe which group each in-
dividual belongs to. Each man i 2 I belongs to one group xi 2 X ; and, similarly, each
woman j 2 J belongs to one group yj 2 Y. There is a finite number of groups; they are
defined by the intersection of the characteristics which are observed by all men and women,
and also by the analyst. On the other hand, men and women of a given group di↵er along
some dimensions that they all observe, but which do not figure in the analyst’s dataset.
Like Choo and Siow, we assume that there is an (uncountably) infinite number of men
in any group x, and of women in any group y. We denote nx the mass of men in group x,
and my the mass of women in group y, and as the problem is homogenous, we can assume
that the total mass of individuals is equal to one. More formally, we assume:
Assumption 1 (Large Market). There is an infinite total number of individuals on the
market. Letting nx be the mass of men of group x, and my the mass of women of group y,





One way to understand intuitively this assumption is to consider a sequence of large





y2Y My ! +1, while the proportion of each group remains constant, that is, the ra-
tios nx = (Nx/S) and my = (My/S) remain constant.
If the total number of individuals were finite, the distribution of the unobserved het-
erogeneity of, say, women of a given observable group would be an empirical distribution
a↵ected by sample uncertainty – we shall return to this in the conclusion. Another benefit
of Assumption 1 is that it mitigates concerns about agents misrepresenting their character-
istics. There is almost always a profitable deviation in finite populations; but as shown by
Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1999), the benefit from such manipulations goes to zero as the
population is replicated. In the large markets limit, the Walrasian prices u˜i and v˜j become
generically unique. We will therefore write “the equilibrium” in what follows.
The analyst can only compute quantities that depend on the observed groups of the
partners in a match. Hence she cannot observe µ˜, and she must focus instead on the matrix
of matches across groups µ = (µxy), where µxy =
P
i,j 1 (xi = x, yj = y) µ˜ij .
The feasibility constraints are µ 2M (n,m), where M (n,m) (or M in the absence of
ambiguity) is the set of |X | ⇥ |Y| non-negative numbers (µxy) that satisfy the (|X | + |Y|)
constraints that the number of married individuals in each group cannot be greater than
the number of individuals in that group:
M (n,m) =
8<:µ   0 : 8x 2 X , X
y2Y





Each element of M is called a “feasible matching”. For notational convenience, we shall
denote µx0 = nx  
P
y2Y µxy the corresponding number of single men of group x and
µ0y = my  
P
x2X µxy the number of single women of group y. We also define the sets of
marital choices that are available to male and female agents, including singlehood:
X0 = X [ {0} , Y0 = Y [ {0} .
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1.2 Matching Surpluses
Choo and Siow (2006) assumed that the utility surplus of a man i of group x (that is, such
that xi = x) who marries a woman of group y can be written as
↵xy + ⌧ + "iy, (1.3)
where ↵xy is the systematic part of the surplus; ⌧ represents the utility transfer (possibly
negative) that the man gets from his partner in equilibrium; and "iy is a standard type I
extreme value random term. If such a man remains single, he gets utility "i0; that is to
say, the systematic utilities of singles ↵x0 are normalized to zero. Similarly, the utility of a
woman j of group yj = y who marries a man of group x can be written as
 xy   ⌧ + ⌘xj , (1.4)
where ⌧ is the utility transfer she leaves to her partner. Again, we normalize  0y = 0.
As shown in Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2015), the key assumption here is that the
joint surplus created when a man i of group x marries a woman j of group y does not allow
for interactions between their unobserved characteristics, conditional on (x, y). This leads
us to assume:
Assumption 2 (Separability). There exists a vector   such that the joint surplus from a
match between a man i in group x and a woman j in group j is
 ˜ij =  xy + "iy + ⌘xj .
This assumption is reminiscent of the “pure characteristics” model of Berry and Pakes
(2007). In Choo and Siow’s formulation, the vector   is simply
 xy = ↵xy +  xy,
which they call the total systematic net gains to marriage; and note that by construction,
 x0 and  0y are zero. It is easy to see that Assumption 2 is equivalent to specifying that if
two men i and i0 belong to the same group x, and their respective partners j and j0 belong
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to the same group y, then the total surplus generated by these two matches is unchanged if
we shu✏e partners:  ˜ij +  ˜i0j0 =  ˜ij0 +  ˜i0j . Note that in this form it is clear that we need
not adopt Choo and Siow’s original interpretation of " as a vector of preference shocks of
the husband and ⌘ as a vector of preference shocks of the wife. To take an extreme example,
we could equally have men who are indi↵erent over partners and are only interested in the
transfer they receive, so that their ex post utility is ⌧ ; and women who also care about some
attractiveness characteristic of men, in a way that may depend on the woman’s group. The
net utility of women of group y would be ("iy   ⌧); the resulting joint surplus would satisfy
Assumption 2 and all of our results would apply2. In other words, there is no need to
assume that the term "iyj is “generated” by man i, nor that the term ⌘jxi was “generated”
by woman j; it may perfectly be the opposite.
While separability is a restrictive assumption, it allows for “matching on unobservables”:
when the analyst observes a woman of group y matched with a man of group x, it may
be because this woman has unobserved characteristics that make her attractive to men of
group x, and/or because this man has a strong unobserved preference for women of group
y. What separability does rule out, however, is sorting on unobserved characteristics on
both sides of the market, i.e. some unobserved preference of this man for some unobserved
characteristics of that woman.
The basic problem we address in this paper is how we can identify   (an array of
|X | ⇥ |Y| unknown numbers) given the observation of µ (an array of the same size.) In
order to study the relation between these two objects, we need to make assumptions on the
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms.
1.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In order to move beyond the multinomial logit setting of Choo and Siow, we allow for very
general distributions of unobserved heterogeneity:
2It is easy to see that in such a model, a man i who is married in equilibrium is matched with a woman
in the group that values his attractiveness most, and he receives a transfer ⌧ i = maxy2Y "iy.
9
Assumption 3 (Distribution of Unobserved Variation in Surplus). The unobserved het-
erogeneity in tastes is such that:
a) For any man i such that xi = x, the |Y0|-dimensional random vector "i = ("iy)y is
drawn from a distribution Px;
b) For any woman j such that yj = y, the |X0|-dimensional random vector ⌘j = (⌘xj)x
is drawn from a distribution Qy.
To summarize, a man i in this economy is characterized by his full type (xi, "i), where
xi 2 X and "i 2 IRY0 ; the distribution of "i conditional on xi = x is Px. Similarly, a woman




where yj 2 Y and ⌘j 2 IRX0 , and the distribution
of ⌘j conditional on yj = y is Qy.
Assumption 3 constitutes a substantial generalization of Choo and Siow. It extends the
logit framework in several important ways: it allows for di↵erent families of distributions,
with any form of heteroskedasticity, and with any pattern of correlation across partner
groups. The need to go beyond the logit framework has long been recognized in Industrial
Organization and in consumer demand theory. This has led to a huge literature on Random
Utility Models, initiated by McFadden’s seminal work on Generalized Extreme Value theory
(McFadden, 1978, see also Anderson et al., 1992 for an exposition and applications.) The
present assumption is more general, as it does not require that the distribution of the terms
"i and ⌘j belong to the GEV class.
2 Social Surplus, Utilities, and Identification
We derive most of our results by considering the “optimal” matching, which maximizes the
total joint surplus. This is known since Shapley and Shubik (1972) to be identical to the
equilibrium matching. As Choo and Siow remind us (p. 177): “A well-known property of
transferable utility models of the marriage market is that they maximize the sum of marital
output in the society”. This is true when marital output is defined as it is evaluated by the
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participants: the market equilibrium in fact maximizes
P
i,j µ˜ij ˜ij over the set of feasible
matchings µ˜. But in order to find the expression of the value function that µ maximizes,
we need to account for terms that reflect the value of matching on unobservables.
2.1 Separability and Discrete Choice
We first argue that separability (Assumption 2) reduces the choice of partner to a one-sided
discrete choice problem. To see this, note that by standard results in the literature (Shapley












where the maximization includes the option of singlehood.
Focus on the first one. It states that the utility man i gets in equilibrium trades o↵ the
surplus his match with woman j creates and the share of the joint surplus he has to give
her, which is given by her own equilibrium utility. Now use Assumption 2: for a man i in








can be rewritten as u˜i = maxy
 










and Uxy =  xy   Vxy, it follows that:
Proposition 1. (Splitting the Surplus)
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, there exist two vectors U and V such that  xy = Uxy + Vxy
and in equilibrium:




and he matches with some woman whose group y achieves the maximum;







and she matches with some man whose group x achieves the maximum.
This result, which will arise as a consequence of Theorem 1 below, also appears in Chi-
appori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2015), with a di↵erent proof. It reduces the two-sided matching
problem to a series of one-sided discrete choice problems that are only linked through the
adding-up formula Uxy+Vxy =  xy. Men of a given group x match with women of di↵erent
groups, since each man i has idiosyncratic "i shocks. But as a consequence of the separa-
bility assumption, if a man of group x matches with a woman of group y, then he would be
equally well-o↵ with any other woman of this group3.
The vectors U and V depend on all of the primitives of the model (the vector  , the
distributions of the utility shocks " and ⌘, and the number of groups n and m.) They are
only a useful construct, and they should not be interpreted as utilities.
2.2 Identification of discrete choice problems
To recover the array  , we start by showing how the utilities U can be recovered from the
choice probabilities µy|x = µxy/nx. To do this, we introduce a general methodology based on
“generalized entropy,” a name which arises from reasons which will soon become clear. In the
following, for any A = (Axy) we denote Ax· = (Ax1, . . . , Ax|Y|) and A·y = (A1y, . . . , A|X |y).
Consider a randomly chosen man in group x, and a vectorU = (Ux0 = 0, Ux1, . . . , Ux,|Y|).
His expected utility (conditional to belonging to this group) is
Gx(Ux·) = EPx max
y2Y0
(Uxy + "y), (2.1)
where we set Ux0 = 0 and the expectation is taken over the random vector ("0, . . . , "|Y|) ⇠
Px. First note that for any two numbers a, b and random variables (", ⌘), the derivative of
Emax(a+", b+⌘) with respect to a is simply the probability that a+" is larger than b+⌘.
Applying the obvious multidimensional generalization to the function Gx, we get
@Gx
@Uxy
(Ux·) = Pr(Uxy + "iy   Uxz + "iz for all z 2 Y0).
3Provided of course that she in turn ends up matched with a man of group x.
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But the right-hand side is simply the probability that a man of group x partners with a







As the expectation of the maximum of linear functions of the (Uxy), Gx is a convex function









y2Y µy|x  1, and G⇤x(µ·|x) = +1 otherwise. Hence, the domain of G⇤x is the
set of µ·|x which is the vector of choice probabilities of alternatives in Y. Mathematically
speaking, G⇤x is the Legendre-Fenchel transform, or convex conjugate of Gx. Like Gx and
for the same reasons, it is a convex function. By the envelope theorem, at the optimum in
the definition of G⇤x we have
@G⇤x
@µy|x
(µ·|x) = Uxy. (2.4)
As a consequence, for any y 2 Y, Uxy is identified from µ·|x, the observed matching patterns
of men of group x. Going back to (2.3), convex duality implies that if µ·|x and Ux· are





By the first order condition (2.2), the optimal U is such that µy|x = @Gx (Ux.) /@Uxy:
Ux· leads to the choice probabilities µ·|x. Hence, letting Y ⇤i be the optimal choice of marital
option y by a man of group x, one has
Gx(Ux·) = E
 
























and U and to show that
they can be evaluated by solving an optimal matching problem:
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the set of probability distributions ⇡ of the random joint vector (Y , "), where Y ⇠ µ·|x is a
random element of Y0, and " ⇠ Px is a random vector of IRY0. For e 2 IRY0 and y 2 Y0,
let  h denote the projection
 h (y, e) := ey.
Then  G⇤x(µ·|x) is the value of the optimal matching problem between the distribution µ·|x










y2Y0 µy|x = 1, while G
⇤





is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
R
⇡y(")d" = µy|x at the optimum.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is simply that each observed choice probability µy|x
must be matched to the values of idiosyncratic preference shocks "i ⇠ Px for which y is the
most preferred choice. The U·|x are the shadow prices that support this matching.
2.3 Social surplus and its individual breakdown
We first give an intuitive derivation of our main result, Theorem 1 below. We define Hy





(Vxy + ⌘x, ⌘0)
◆
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The first equality explains how the total surplus W is broken down at the individual level:
the average expected equilibrium utility of men in group x is ux = Gx(Ux·), and similarly
for women. The second equality shows how the total surplus is broken down at the level of
the couples. We turn this into a formal statement, which is proved in Appendix A:
Theorem 1. (Social and Individual Surpluses) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3,
(i) the optimal matching µ maximizes the social gain over all feasible matchings µ 2M,
that is







Equivalently, W is given by its dual expression









s.t. Uxy + Vxy =  xy.
The function W ( ,n,m) is convex in   and concave in (n,m).
(ii) A man i of group x who marries a woman of group y⇤ obtains utility
Uxy⇤ + "iy⇤ = max
y2Y0
(Uxy + "iy)
where Ux0 = 0, and U solves (2.10).
(iii) The average expected utility of the men of group x is





.(iv) Parts (ii) and (iii) transpose to the other side of the market with the obvious changes.
The right-hand side of equation (2.9) gives the value of the social surplus when the
matching patterns are µ. The first term
P
xy µxy xy reflects “group preferences”: if groups
x and y generate more surplus when matched, then in the absence of unobserved hetero-
geneity they should be matched with higher probability. On the other hand, the second
and the third terms reflect the e↵ect of the dispersion of individual a nities, conditional
on observed characteristics: those men i in a group x that have more a nity to women of
group y should be matched to this group with a higher probability. In the one-dimensional
Beckerian example, a higher x or y could reflect higher education. If the marital surplus is
complementary in the educations of the two partners,   is supermodular and the first term
is maximized when matching partners with similar education levels (as far as feasibility
constraints allow.) But because of the dispersion of marital surplus that comes from the "
and ⌘ terms, it will be optimal to have some marriages between dissimilar partners.
To interpret the formula, start with the case when unobserved heterogeneity is dwarfed
by variation due to observable characteristics:  ˜ij '  xy if xi = x and yj = y. Then we
know that the observed matching µ must maximize
P
x,y µxy xy. If on the other hand data
is so poor that unobserved heterogeneity dominates (  ' 0), then the analyst should observe
something that, to her, looks like completely random matching. Information theory tells us
that entropy is a natural measure of statistical disorder; and as we will see in Example 1, in
the simple case analyzed by Choo and Siow the function E is just the usual notion of entropy.
For this reason, we call it the generalized entropy of the matching. In the intermediate case
in which some of the variation in marital surplus is driven by group characteristics (through
the  xy) and some is carried by the unobserved heterogeneity terms "iy and ⌘xj , the market
equilibrium trades o↵ matching on group characteristics against matching on unobserved
characteristics, as measured by the generalized entropy terms in E(µ).
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2.4 Identification of Matching Surplus
Theorem 1 has two mathematically equivalent readings that have quite di↵erent practical
purposes. One may use it to obtain the expression of µ as a function of  : this is an
equilibrium characterization. Conversely, one may use it to obtain the expression of   as a
function of µ: this identifies the joint surplus from the data. Our next result, Theorem 2,
illustrates the mathematical duality between these two points of view.
First note that the constraints associated to µ 2M in (2.9) do not bind in the many
datasets in which there are no empty cells: then µxy > 0 for x 2 X and y 2 Y, andP
x2X µxy < nx,
P
y2Y µxy < my. In other words, µ then belongs to the interior of M. It
is easy to see that this must hold under the following assumption:
Assumption 4 (Full support). The distributions Px and Qy all have full support and are
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Assumption 4 of course holds for the Choo and Siow model. It can be relaxed in the
obvious way: all that matters is that the supports of the distributions are wide enough
relative to the magnitude of the variations in the matching surplus. Since the functions G⇤x
and H⇤y are convex, they are di↵erentiable almost everywhere—and under Assumption 4
they actually are di↵erentiable everywhere. This is not essential to our approach; in fact,
our Example 2 in section 3 violates Assumption 4. But it allows us to obtain striking
formulæ, as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4,











for y 2 Y. (2.12)




















The dual nature of Theorem 2 is clear. The equalities (2.11) allow to express µ as
a function of U and V (“equilibrium characterization” point of view); they invert into
relations (2.12) which express U and V (and thus  ) as a function of µ (“identification”
point of view.)
The previous result does not assume that transfers are observed. When they are, the
systematic parts of pre-transfer utilities (↵, ) are also identified:
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, denote (↵, ) the systematic parts of















Therefore if transfers ⌧xy are observed, both pre-transfer utilities ↵xy and  xy are also
identified.
This is unlikely to occur in family economics, where the econometrician typically does
not observe transfers between partners. It is a much more reasonable asumption in other
settings where matching theory has been successfully applied, as the CEO compensation
literature, for instance, where the compensation amount is often available.
Combining Proposition 2 with Theorem 2, all of the quantities in Theorem 1 can be
computed by solving simple linear programming problems. This makes identification and
estimation feasible in practice.
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2.5 Comparative statics and testable predictions
Recall from Theorem 1 that the partial derivative of the social surplus W( ,n,m) with







therefore the “unexpected symmetry” result proven by Decker et al. (2012, Theorem 2) for
the multinomial logit Choo and Siow model in fact holds for all separable models. We show
in Appendix C that in fact most of the comparative statics results of Decker et al extend
to the present framework, and can be used as testable predictions for the separable model.
Another remarkable feature of our results is that all of the functions involved are convex
(or concave.) Since utilities are derivatives of these functions, their own Jacobian ma-
trices must not only be symmetric but also satisfy positive- or negative-semi definiteness







This property against holds for all separable models. On the other hand, each separable
model has its own specific predictions. As an illustration, hold   and m fixed in the Choo
and Siow model, and let the group sizes of men n vary. It is easy to see from (3.4) below











This identity is in principle testable by pooling data across similar markets with di↵erent
group sizes for men. Other specifications would of course yield di↵erent predictions.
3 Examples
3.1 Models of heterogeneity
While Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 provide a general way of computing surplus and utilities,
they can be derived in closed form in important special cases. In all formulæ below, the
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and similarly for women. In this section we will maintain Assumptions 1, 2.
Our first example is the classical multinomial logit model of Choo and Siow, which is
obtained as a particular case of the results in Section 2 when the Px and Qy distributions
are iid standard type I extreme value:4
Example 1 (Choo and Siow). Assume that Px and Qy are the distributions of centered





1A and G⇤x(µ·|x) = µ0|x log(µ0|x)+X
y2Y
µy|x logµy|x. (3.2)
where the term µ0|x is a function of µ·|x defined in (3.1). Expected utilities are ux =









µxy log µx|y, (3.3)
which is a standard entropy5. Surplus and matching patterns are linked by
 xy = 2 log µxy   logµx0   logµ0y, (3.4)
which is Choo and Siow’s (2006) identification result. See Appendix B.1 for details.
The multinomial logit Choo and Siow model is the simplest example which fits into Mc-
Fadden’s Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) framework. This includes most specifications
used in classical discrete choice models. A very simple instance is the heteroskedastic model
4From now on we deviate from Choo and Siow by centering all type I extreme values distributions we
use; the only e↵ect of this normalization is that it eliminates the Euler constant   = 0.577 . . . from expected
utilities.
5The connection between the logit model and the classical entropy function is well known; see e.g.
Anderson et al. (1988).
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considered by Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2015); it allows the scale parameters of the
type I extreme value distributions to vary across genders or groups. Then Px has a scale
parameter  x and Qy has a scale parameter ⌧y; the expected utilities are ux =   x logµ0|x
and vy =  ⌧y logµ0|y, and the general identification formula gives
 xy = ( x + ⌧y) logµxy    x logµx0   ⌧y log µ0y. (3.5)
An extension of this model is the well-known nested logit model, which we study as
Example 3 in Appendix B.
While the GEV framework is convenient, it is common in the applied literature to allow
for random variation in preferences over observed characteristics of products. The modern
approach to empirical industrial organization, for instance, allows di↵erent buyers to have
idiosyncratic preferences over observed characteristics of products6. Closer to our frame-
work, hedonic models also build on idiosyncratic preferences for observed characteristics,
on both sides of a match7. Our setup allows for such specifications; we elaborate on the
mixed logit model in Example 4 in Appendix B.
Assume, more generally, that men of group x care for a vector of observed characteristics
of partners ⇣x(y), but the intensity of the preferences of each man i in the group depends on a
vector "i which is drawn from some given distribution. Then we could take Px to be the joint
distribution of (⇣x(y) · "i)y. We investigate a particular case of this specification in the next
example: the Random Scalar Coe cient (RSC) model, where the dimension of ⇣x(y) and "i
is one, which makes computations very easy. Assuming further that the distribution of "i is
uniform, we are led to what we call the Random Uniform Scalar Coe cient Model (RUSC).
This last model has one additional advantage: it yields simple closed-form expressions, even
though it does not belong to the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) class.
Example 2 (Random [Uniform] Scalar Coe cient (RSC/RUSC) models). Assume that for
6See the literature surveyed in Ackerberg et al (2007) or Reiss and Wolak (2007).
7See Ekeland et al (2004) and Heckman et al (2010).
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each man i in group x,
"iy = "i⇣x(y),
where ⇣x(y) is a scalar index of the observable characteristics of women which is the same
for all men in the same group x, and the "i’s are iid random variables which are assumed
to be continuously distributed according to a c.d.f. F" (which could also depend on x.) We
call this model the Random Scalar Coe cient (RSC) model; and we show in Appendix B.2

















and f¯y(x) is defined similarly.
Assuming further that the "i are uniformly distributed over [0, 1], we call this model the
Random Uniform Scalar Coe cient (RUSC) model. In this case, simpler formulæ can be
given. For any x 2 X , let Sx be the square matrix with elements Sxyy0 = max (⇣x(y), ⇣x (y0))
for y, y0 2 Y0. Define T x by T xyy0 = Sxy0 + Sx0y0   Sxyy0   Sx00, and let sigmaxy = Sx00   Sxy0.





xµ·|x + 2 x.µ·|x   Sx00). (3.7)
If we now assume that preferences have such a structure for every group x of men and for
every group y of women (so that ⌘xj = ⌘j⇠y(x)), then the generalized entropy is quadratic
in µ:
E (µ) = 1
2
(µ0Aµ+ 2B0µ+ c), (3.8)
where the expressions for A, B and c are given by (B.4)–(B.5) in Appendix B.2. As a
consequence, the optimal matching solves a simple quadratic problem. See Appendix B.2 for
details.
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The structure of heterogeneity in the RUSC/RSC models is related to that investigated
in Ekeland et al. (2004) and Heckman et al. (2010), with continuous observed characteris-
tics. In Ekeland et al. (2004) and Heckman et al. (2010), y is a continuous and scalar quality
parameter, and the heterogeneity terms is given by "iy = "iy. However, their identification
strategy di↵ers from ours. Ekeland et al. (2004) use an additively separable form of ↵(x, y)
and are thus able to identify the distribution of ", which is fixed in our setting. In contrast,
In contrast, the assumptions in Heckman et al. (2010) assume that the distribution of "i is
fixed, and identification is obtained from a quantile transformation approach, which does
not extend to the discrete case we presently investigate.
3.2 Discussion
The Choo-Siow multinomial logit model has the virtue of simplicity, but it relies on strong
assumptions. This calls for caution when basing conclusions on it; we already pointed out
some of its strong testable predictions in sectin 2.5. Expected utilities can also be a much
richer function of observed matching patterns than in Choo and Siow’s multinomial logit
model.
Take the identified surplus for instance, whose expression is given in Choo and Siow’s











This shows that if we write   as a function of (µ,n,m), then  xy only depends on µ via
µxy,
P
y0 6=y µxy0 and
P
x0 6=x µx0y. Therefore if y







To interpret this, start from a given matching µ which is rationalized by some surplus  ,
and suppose that a single man of group xmarries a single woman of group y0 6= y. Then (3.9)
tells us that our estimator of the surplus  xy should change by exactly the same amount
as if that woman had belonged to any other group y00 6= y. Derivations in Appendix B.2
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show that in the RUSC model, the e↵ect of changes in observed matching patterns on the
estimated surplus @ /@µ allows for much richer e↵ects than (3.9).
4 Parametric Inference
First assume that all observations concern a single matching market. While the formula
in Theorem 1(i) gives a straightforward nonparametric estimator of the systematic surplus
function  , with multiple payo↵-relevant observed characteristics x and y it is bound to be
very unreliable. In addition, we do not know the distributions Px and Qy. Both of these
remarks point to the need for a parametric model in most applications. Such a model would





in some finite-dimensional parameter space ⇤.




y Mˆy individuals, where Nˆx (resp.
Mˆy) denotes the number of men of group x (resp. women of group y) in the sample, and
nˆx = Nˆx/Sˆ and mˆx = Mˆx/Sˆ their respective empirical frequencies. We assume that the
data was generated by the parametric model above, with true parameter vector  0.
Recall the expression of the social surplus:






xy   E  (µ)
!
Let µ  be the optimal matching. We will show in Section 5 how it can be computed,
in some cases very e ciently. For now we focus on statistical inference on  . We propose
two methods: a very general Maximum Likelihood method, and a simpler moment-based
method that is only available for some important subclasses of models.
4.1 Maximum Likelihood estimation
In this section we will use Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimation, where we
condition on the observed margins nˆx and mˆy. For each man of group x, the probability
of being matched with a woman of type y is µ xy/nˆx; and a similar expression holds for
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each woman of group y. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the choice of each individual is
stochastic in that it depends on his vector of unobserved heterogeneity, and these vectors
are independent across men and women. Hence the log-likelihood of the sample is the sum






































The Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator  ˆ
MLE
given by the maximization of
logL is consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically e cient under the usual set
of assumptions.
As an illustration, the MLE procedure is described for the nested logit model in Exam-
ple 3 of Appendix B.3. Sometimes the expression of the likelihood µ  can be obtained in
closed form. This is the case in the Random Uniform Scalar Coe cient model:
Example 2 continued. Assume that the data generating process is the RUSC model of
Example 2. We parameterize  , ⇣x and ⇠y by a parameter vector   2 IRK , hence param-
eterizing S and T and thus A and B. If the optimal matching µ  is interior, then it is
given by µ  = (A ) 1
 
    B   and its log-likelihood can be deduced by (4.1).
Maximum likelihood estimation has the usual statistical advantages; and it allows for
joint parametric estimation of the surplus function and of the unobserved heterogeneity.
However, the log-likelihood may have several local extrema and be hard to maximize. In
such cases, an alternative, moment-based method may be more appealing.
4.2 Moment-based estimation: The Linear Model
We now introduce a method based on moments which is computationally very e cient but
can only be used under two additional assumptions.
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We first make the restrictive assumption that the distribution of the unobservable het-
erogeneity is parameter-free—as it is in Choo and Siow 2006 for instance; or at least we
conduct the analysis for fixed values of its parameters. Then we take a linear parameteri-







where the parameter   2 IRK and  1, . . . , K are K known linearly independent basis
surplus vectors. If the number of basis surplus vectors expands, this specification can be
seen as a sieve approximation that can converge to any surplus function. We do not pursue
this, and we assume that the true   takes the form (4.2) for finite K.
For any feasible matching µ, we define the associated comoments as the average values








In particular, the empirical comoments are associated with the observed matching µˆ.
The Moment Matching estimator of   we propose in this section simply matches the
comoments predicted by the model with the empirical comoments; that is, it solves the
system
Ck(µˆ) = Ck(µ ) for all k.














Note that the objective function in this program is concave, as W is convex in   and   
is linear in  . We now show that these two definitions are equivalent:
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, assume the distributions of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms Px and Qy are known. Then:
(i) The Moment Matching estimator yields the equality of predicted comoments and




(ii) The Moment Matching estimator  ˆ
MM
is also the vector of Lagrange multipliers of
the moment constraints in the program
Emin (µˆ) = min
µ2M
⇣
E (µ) : Ck(µ) = Ck(µˆ), 8k
⌘
. (4.4)
Both (4.3) and (4.4) are globally convex programs, and hence very easy to solve numer-





Hence the first-order condition in (4.3) is simply (µˆ  µ ) ·   = 0.
While the Moment Matching estimator is not asymptotically e cient in general, it
coincides with the MLE in the Choo and Siow model (see Appendix B.1):
Example 1 continued. Fix the distributions of the unobservable heterogeneities to be
type I extreme value distributed as in the multinomial logit Choo-Siow setting, and assume












Therefore in this setting the Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimator and the Moment





This equivalence is particular to the Choo and Siow multinomial logit setting. It does
not obtain in the RUSC model for instance; but the latter is interesting as one can obtain
an explicit expression of  ˆ
MM
in the “interior” case in which no cell is empty (µxy > 0 for
all (x, y))—see Appendix B.2.
Finally, Part (ii) of Theorem 3 generates a very simple specification test. Compare the
actual value E (µˆ) of the generalized entropy associated to the empirical distribution to the
value Emin (µˆ) of the program (4.4). By definition, E (µˆ)   Emin (µˆ); moreover, these two
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values coincide if and only if the model is well-specified. We state this in the following
proposition:8
Proposition 3. (A Specification Test) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, assume that the
distributions of the unobserved heterogeneity terms Px and Qy are known. Then E (µˆ)  
Emin (µˆ), with equality if and only if there is a value   of the parameter such that    =  .
4.3 Parameterization, Testing, and Multimarket Data
Theorem 1 shows that, given a specification of the distribution of the unobserved hetero-
geneities Px andQy, there is a one-to-one correspondence between µ amd  . Any matching
on a single market can be rationalized by exactly one model that satisfies assumptions 1,
2, and 3. The downside of this result is that it is impossible to test separability using only
data on one market, even assuming perfect knowledge of the distributions of unobserved
heterogeneity.
Of course, assuming the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is a strong
assumption, while on the other hand, we may be content with a parametric specification of
 . Typically, we will use much fewer than the |X |⇥|Y| degrees of freedom of a nonparanetric
 . Any unused degrees of freedom can be used for inference on the distributions Px andQy,
appropriately parameterized, or in order to test the assumptions of the model. For example,
if X and Y are finite subsets of IRd, we could resort to a semiparametric specification in the
spirit of Ekeland et al. (2004):  xy =  1 (y) + y
0 2 (x). This would restrict the number of
degrees of freedom in   to |Y|+ d⇥ |X |.
An alternative empirical strategy is to use multiple markets with restricted parametric
variation in the joint surplus   and the distributions of unobserved heterogeneity Px and
Qy. The variations in the groups sizes n and m across markets then generate variation
in optimal matchings that can be used to overidentify the model and generate testable
8The critical values of the test can be obtained by parametric bootstrap for instance. One could also run
the test for di↵erent specifications of the distributions of heterogeneities and invert it to obtain confidence
intervals for the parameters of Px and mathbfQy.
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restrictions. Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2015) pursue a simple variant of this strategy.
5 Computation
Maximizing the conditional likelihood requires computing the optimal matching µ  for
a large number of values of  . But the optimal matching is a large object in realistic
applications; and obtaining it by maximizing W in (2.9) is not a very practical option. We
develop here an algorithm based on the Iterative Projection Fitting Procedure (IPFP) that
often provides a much more e cient solution.
Take the multinomial logit Choo-Siow model of Example 1 for instance. Fix a value of
  and drop it from the notation: let the joint surplus function be  , with optimal matching







As noted by Decker et al. (2012), we could just plug this into the feasibility constraintsP
y µxy + µx0 = nˆx and
P
x µxy + µ0y = mˆy and solve for the numbers of singles µx0 and
µ0y. Unfortunately, this results in a system of |X| + |Y | quadratic equations in as many
unknowns that is quite unwieldy as soon as we consider more than a few groups.
To find a feasible solution of (3.4), an alternative approach is to start from an infeasible
solution and to project it on the set of feasible matchings M(nˆ, mˆ). The di culty is to
do this and still satisfy (5.1); we now show how it can be done using IPFP. As its name
indicates, the Iterative Projection Fitting Procedure was designed to find projections on
intersecting sets of constraints, by projecting iteratively on each constraint9.
Assume that there exists a convex function E that extends the generalized entropy E in
the following manner: E (µ¯) is defined for all non-negative µ¯ =
 
µ = (µxy)x,y, (µx0)x, (µ0y)y
 
;
and it coincides with E(µ) wheneverX
y
µxy + µx0 = nx and
X
x
µxy + µ0y = my for all x, y. (5.2)
9It is used for instance to impute missing values in data (and known for this purpose as the RAS method.)
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Problem (2.9) can be rewritten as the maximization of
P
x2X ,y2Y µxy xy   E (µ¯) over the
set of vectors µ¯   0 that satisfy the constraints in (5.2). Denoting ux and vy the Lagrange























and its first order conditions are
@E
@µxy
=  xy   ux   vy ; @E
@µx0
=  ux ; @E
@µ0y
=  vy.
However, instead of solving the full problem (5.4), we solve it iteratively. Start with




and set k = 0. After completing step 2k with values
(µ¯(2k),u(2k),v(2k)), at step (2k + 1) we keep v = v(2k) and we solve the minmax problem






Using the first order conditions, this is equivalent to solving
@E
@µxy
(µ¯) =  xy   ux   v(2k)y ;
@E
@µx0
(µ¯) =  ux ; @E
@µ0y
(µ¯) =  v(2k)y (5.6)
along with
P
y2Y0 µxy = nx. Call u
(2k+1) and µ¯(2k+1) the solutions to this problem..






which amounts to solving
@E
@µxy
(µ¯) =  xy   u(2k+1)x   vy ;
@E
@µx0






x2X0 µxy = my. Call v
(2k+2) and µ¯(2k+2) the solutions.
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If µ¯(2k+2) is close enough to µ¯(2k), then we take µ¯ = µ¯2k+2 to be the optimal matching
and we stop; otherwise we add one to k and we move to step (2k + 3).
Note that the algorithm can be interpreted as a Walrasian taˆtonnement process where
the prices of the observed characteristics x and the y are moved iteratively in order to adjust
supply to demand on each side of the market. We prove in Appendix A that:
Theorem 4. The algorithm converges to the solution µ¯ of (2.9) and to the corresponding
expected utilities.
Note that there are many possible ways of extending E (which is defined only on M) to
the entire space of µ¯   0. In practice, good judgement should be exercised, as the choice
of an extension E that makes it easy to solve (5.6) and (5.8) is crucial for the performance
of the algorithm.
To illustrate, take the multinomial logit Choo and Siow model from Example 1. Here












and we have @E/@µxy = 2 + 2 log µxy, @E/@µx0 = 1 + logµx0, and @E/@µ0y = 1 + logµ0y.
Therefore solving (5.6) at step (2k+1) boils down to the simple task of finding the root











We illustrate the algorithm for the nested logit model in Example 3 in Appendix B.3. We
tested the performance of our proposed algorithm on an instance of Choo and Siow problem;
we report the results in Appendix E. Our IPFP algorithm is extremely fast compared to
standard optimization or equation-solving methods.
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6 Empirical Application
Choo and Siow 2006 illustrated the potential of separable matching models by taking the
specification of Example 1 to US Census data before and after the 1973 Roe vs Wade
Supreme Court ruling that barred state restrictions on abortion before the third semester
of pregnancy. As some states (which CS call the “non-reform states”) had already relaxed
restrictions on abortion, the ruling had fewer e↵ects there than in the “reform states”.
This naturally suggests a di↵erence-of -di↵erence approach in which the expected utilities
of groups of women and men on the marriage markets of reform and non-reform states are
estimated before and after the ruling. To do this, Choo and Siow pooled data from the
1970 Census and the marriage records of 1971 and 1972 to describe the marriage markets
before the 1973 ruling, and the 1980 Census and the marriage records of 1981 and 1982.
Our aim in this section is to compare three di↵erent approaches to this data10:
1. using the same specification as CS (nonparametric Choo and Siow, or “CS NP” in
the figures)
2. using a parametric specification of their model (parametric Choo and Siow, “CS P”)
3. and finally, using the RUSC specification of Example 2 (“RUSC”.)
We concentrate throughout on men and women aged 16 to 40 (this covers more than 90% of
marriages in this period.) In each case, we estimate four models of the marriage market—
two for the 1970s data (in reform and in non-reform states) and two for the 1980s. In cases 2
and 3, we use model selection criteria to choose a specification. Then we take the di↵-of-di↵
to estimate the e↵ect of Roe vs Wade on the expected utilities from marriage of men and
women of di↵erent ages. Finally, we estimate two models on marriage data from 1981 alone,
and we use the estimated model to predict marriages in 1982, when the numbers of available
10We are very grateful to Eugene Choo and Aloysius Siow for giving us access to their data and code.
We corrected a small mistake in the construction of the data—CS did not update the ages of the subjects
between Census year+1 and Census year+2. This does not a↵ect their conclusions.
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men and women for each age have changed. This last exercise allows us to evaluate the
comparative statics of the models, as well as their performance out-of-sample.
6.1 Implementing the Specifications
6.1.1 Nonparametric Choo and Siow
Expected utilities in Example 1 are simply minus the logarithms of the marriage rates and
are therefore extimated straightforwardly. We also estimated the joint surplus matrix  
from marriages in 1981; and we used these estimates to project marriages in 1982, given
the numbers of available men and women at each age in 198211.
6.1.2 Parametric Choo and Siow
We also estimated parameterized versions of the Choo and Siow models, writing
 xy = Xxy 
where the X are polynomials of the ages of the two partners. For each value  , we computed
the optimal matching using the IPFP algorithm of section 5; and we maximized the resulting
log-likelihood function. To choose the polynomial terms to be included in the covariates X,
we turned to standard model selection techniques. Selecting models by the Akaike or the
Bayesian information criteria only works for unweighted maximum likelihood estimation.
Since the surveys we use have fairly large variation in sampling weights, we needed to resort
to a more general version of AIC: the Takeuchi Information Criterion. TIC applies even
if the models may all be misspecified and for other estimation methods than MLE. Let ✓¯k
be the pseudo-value for model k, and Ik and Jk be the usual matrices. Then AIC would
minimize
 2 logLk + 2pk;
11This required imputing numbers for the youngest men and women in 1982, since by then the availables
of 1980 are aged at least 18; we used the same numbers that we observed in 1980, and we assigned to them
the same marriage rates as in 1981.
33
we should instead minimize
 2 logLk + 2Tr(IkJ 1k ).
With variable sampling weights, these two criteria give quite di↵erent results. We applied
TIC to select from a set of regressors in ages of men and women of the form AkmA
l
w. The
selected models allow for terms of total degrees up to k + l = 5. Table 1 shows the main
characteristics of the selected models. The “maximum logL” column of the table shows the
value of the log-likelihood for the nonparametric specification of Example 1. The parametric
models achieve a very good fit on the whole12.
Wave Reform Zero cells maximum logL Parametric CS RUSC
Parameters logL Parameters logL
1970 N 1.9% -1.04 14 -1.05 21 -1.07
1970 Y 1.8% -1.00 14 -1.02 21 -1.03
1980 N 0.4% -0.84 14 -0.85 21 -0.86
1980 Y 0.2% -0.72 19 -0.73 21 -0.82
1981 N 3.4% -0.48 13 -0.49 21 -0.49
1981 Y 2.6% -0.45 13 -0.46 21 -0.48
Table 1: Comparing the Models
6.1.3 RUSC
Finally, we turn to the RUSC specification of Example 2. One of the distinguishing features
of this specification is that the error terms have compact support. As such and unlike
the Choo and Siow models, it allows for zero matching probabilities. This is easily seen
by referring to the formula for the entropy in Example 2: if the solution µ has all of its
components positive, then it is given by the first-order condition
µ = A 1(  B); (6.1)
12In the Choo and Siow model, it follows from the example on page 27 that the entropy-based specification
test of Proposition 3 is just a likelihood-ratio test, and we did not implement it.
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and if a component of the right-hand side of this equality is negative, this is impossible.
Suppose for instance that (    B) has at least one negative component; then since all
elements of A and µ are non-negative, the corresponding first-order condition cannot hold.
Note also that this is by no means a non-generic case: it holds on open sets of parameter
values.
Allowing for zero matching probabilities is both an asset and a complication. It is
an asset because much economic data in fact contains zero-probability cells. In the Choo
and Siow data, several of the subsamples we use have some zero cells13, as shown in the
third column of Table 1. But finite-support errors, which make zero probabilities possible,
also beget numerical di culties. To start with, the log-likelihood element for cell (x, y) is
µˆxy logµxy( ); parameter values that predict µxy( ) = 0 when µˆxy > 0 will give (minus)
infinite log-likelihood. Moreover, the finite support generates min and max operators in the
definitions of A and B (see Appendix B.2.) For instance,
Axy,xy0( ) = min(⇣x(y; ), ⇣x(y
0; ))
if the ⇣’s are positive. At any parameter values where two values of ⇣x coincide, the resulting
µ will be a non-di↵erentiable function of  ; and the log-likelihood function will have a kink.
There are many such kinks, and this creates serious di culties with the usual gradient-based
maximization algorithms. It is relatively easy to compute derivatives analytically where they
exist, but this only gives misleading information to the algorithm. We experimented with
algorithms that do not rely on derivatives; but they were very slow and got stuck at clearly
non-optimal points. Not having good initial parameter values for the ⇣x(y; ) and ⇠y(x; )
only compounded the problem.
We resorted to a hybrid strategy to obtain good estimates of the parameters. We used
separate parameter vectors  ⇣ , ⇠ and    for the ⇣, ⇠ and   components of the RUSC
model. For fixed parameter values ( ⇣ , ⇠), we optimized the log-likelihood14 over   ,
13Trade is another area where matching methods have become popular in recent years (see Costinot–Vogel
2014); and trade data also has typically many zero cells.
14Since the parameter values sometimes predicted zero probabilities for cell where marriages were actually
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starting from the parameters that best fit (6.1) and using a derivative-free algorithm. To
find the optimal µ for any  , we used the Gurobi quadratic optimizer15.
Getting a set of estimates using this process is too slow to replicate the kind of extensive
model selection we used for the parametric CS model. We settled on a quadratic specifica-
tion of the ⇣x(y) and ⇠y(x) in the ages of both partners, with polynomials of total degree
three of less for  xy. The estimated models have a total of 21 parameters.






of Theorem 1(ii) and we combined it with (3.8).
6.2 Di↵-of-di↵ Estimates
Figure 1 computes the impact of Roe vs Wade on expected utilities for men and women aged
16 to 40, along with 95% confidence bars for the CS models16. CS did not report standard
errors for their estimates; correct standard errors must take into account the sampling errors
and weights, and the complex correlation structure of sampling errors as they go through
logarithmic transforms and double di↵erences. Even with such large samples (the sampling
rates vary from 1/2 to 1/50), many of the di↵-of-di↵ estimates in the first row of Figure 1 are
quite imprecise. In particular, the e↵ect of Roe vs Wade on women’s expected utilities from
marriage is small and insignificant at most ages. On the other hand, the fall in expected
utilities of young men is large and is highly significant at their peak marriage ages. As
noted by Choo and Siow (page 193), this is a “problematic” result; changes in abortion
laws should have a larger impact on women than on men.
As one would expect, the di↵-of-di↵ estimates from the parametric specification of the
observed, we replaced the logarithm function by a C2 extension for x <  , so that it only took finite values.
Then we gradually took   to 0.
15See Gurobi (2015).



































Figure 1: E↵ect of Roe vs Wade on Expected Utilities from Marriage
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CS model are very similar, but they are both smoother and more precisely estimated—see
the second row of Figure 1.
Interestingly, the e↵ect of Roe vs Wade estimated from the RUSC model (third row)
has a pattern that is much closer to what intuition suggests: the liberalization of abortion
had a more negative e↵ect on the utility from marriage of young women than on that of
young men. The left-hand panel (for men) is very similar to those on the first two rows, but
the right-hand panel shows a much larger negative e↵ect for young women than for young
men17.
6.3 Predicting Marriages in 1982
For each of our three models, the simplest way of predicting marriages in 1982 is to simply
project the marriage rates at each age simulated from the 1981 estimates on the observed
margins, that is the men and women who are not married at the beginning of 1981. We
call this the naive predictor, as it assumes away any change in marriage behavior between
1981 and 1982.
Remember that in each model the optimal matching µ is a function of both the joint
surplus   and the margins n and m. Changes in the margins act both by simply scaling
up or down the supply of available partners, and by changing the allocation of the surplus
and therefore the equilibrium marriage patterns. The na¨ıve predictor neglects the second,
“price” e↵ect. Our model predictor allows for it, by simulating the marriage rates for the
margins observed in 1982.
We implemented these two predictors for each model and in both categories of states; and
we focus here on the predicted numbers of marriages at each age for both genders. Figure 2
plots the prediction errors (predicted minus observed) for the numbers of marriages in 1982.
In each panel, the di↵erence between the dashed curve and the solid curve corresponds
to the “price e↵ects” induced by the change in margins betwen 1981 and 1982. These price
17Unlike the CS models, we need to normalize the scale of utilities in the RUSC model. We did it so that
the range of di↵-of-di↵ e↵ects is similar; but this is arbitrary.
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e↵ects are much smaller in non-reform states than in reform states. A look at the data
explains why: while the total number of available individuals did not change much in non-
reform states, it decreased markedly in non-reform states; and this decrease was mostly
due to women. With fewer women, the expected utilities of men fall; and the price e↵ect
increases the number of predicted marriages for women and reduces it for men. This is
exactly what the second and fourth column show consistently. The changes in margins in
non-reform states turn out to be too small for the price e↵ects to show.
The second row of Figure 2 shows that the parametric Choo and Siow models behave
very badly out of sample: they underpredict marriages by about 5% at the peak ages of
20-25. The RUSC model performs much better in this respect, even if their performance at
the youngest ages (18-20) is not very good.
Concluding Remarks
As mentioned earlier, several other approaches to estimating matching models with hetero-
geneity exist. One could directly specify the equilibrium utilities of each man and woman,
as Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely (2010) did in a non-transferable utility model. Under sep-
arability, this would amount to choosing distributions Px and Qy and a parametrization  
of U and V , and fitting the multinomial choice model where for instance men maximize
Uxy( )+"iy over their marital options y 2 Y0. The downside is that unlike the joint surplus,
the utilities U and V are not primitive objects; and they cannot even be interpreted as
utilities, and it is hard to argue for a particular specification.
It is worthwhile noting that Fox and Yang (2012) take an approach that is somewhat dual
to ours: while we use separability to restrict the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
so that we can focus on the surplus over observables, they restrict the latter in order to
recover the distribution of complementarities across unobservables. To do this, they rely on
pooling data across many markets; given the high dimensionality of unobservable shocks,











































Figure 2: Prediction errors on marriages in 1982
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We have left several interesting theoretical issues for future research. One such issue
is the behavior of the finite population approximation of the model. We have worked
in an idealized model with an infinite number of agents within each observable group;
however, when there is a finite number of agents in each group, the surplus function  ˜ij =
  (xi, yj) + "iy + ⌘xj becomes stochastic. It is easy to see from the proof in Appendix A

















The law of large numbers implies the pointwise convergences Gˆx (Ux·) ! Gx (Ux·) and
Hˆy (V·y) ! Hy (V·y) as the number of individuals gets large. It is natural to expect that
the solutions µˆ and (Uˆ , Vˆ ) of the finitely sampled primal and dual problems converge to
their large population analogs18. This goes beyond the scope of the present paper and is
left as a conjecture. Likewise, we leave the exploration of the rate of convergence for future
research.
To conclude, let us emphasize the wide applicability of the methods introduced in the
present paper, and the potential for extensions. On the methodological front, one chal-
lenge is to extend the logit setting of Choo and Siow to the case where the observable
characteristics of the partners may be continuous. This issue is addressed by Dupuy and
Galichon (2014) using the theory of extreme value processes; they also propose a test of the
number of relevant dimensions for the matching problem. While the framework we used
here is bipartite, one-to-one matching, our results open the way to possible extensions to
other matching problems. For instance, it may be insightful in the study of trading on net-
works, when transfers are allowed (thus providing an empirical counterpart to Hatfield and
Kominers, 2012, and Hatfield et al., 2013). Also, while the present paper operates under
the maintained assumption that utility is fully transferable without frictions, this assump-
tion can be relaxed; Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2014) study models with imperfectly
18What is needed is to show that the gradient of the sum of the Legendre transforms of the Gˆx and the
Hˆy maps converges to its population analog.
41
transferable utility and separable logit heterogeneity, while Hsieh (2012) looks at models
with nontransferable utility and a similar form of heterogeneity.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 2






















where U¯xy =  U˜xy and U¯x0 = 0 in the second line. The first term in the minimand is the
expectation of U¯x· under the distribution µY |x=x; therefore this can be rewritten as
G⇤x(µ·|x) =   min
U¯xy+W¯x("i·) "iy
{EµY |x=xU¯xY +EPxW¯x("i)}
where the minimum is taken over all pairs of functions (U¯x·, W¯x("i)) that satisfy the in-
equality. We recognize the value of the dual of a matching problem in which the margins
are µY |x=x and Px and the surplus is "iy. By the equivalence of the primal and the dual,
this yields Expression (2.7).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In the proof we denote n˜ (x, ") the distribution of (x, ") where the distribution of x is n,







1 {(x, ") 2 S} dPx (") .
(i) By the dual formulation of the matching problem (see Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame,
1992), the market equilibrium assigns utilities u˜ (x, ") to man i such that xi = x and "i = "
and v˜ (y, ⌘) to woman j such that yj = y and ⌘j = ⌘ so as to solve
W = min
✓Z
u˜ (x, ") dn˜ (x, ") +
Z
v˜ (y, ⌘) dm˜ (y, ⌘)
◆
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where the minimum is taken under the set of constraints u˜ (x, ") + v˜ (y, ⌘)    xy + "y + ⌘x,
u˜ (x, ")   "0, and v˜ (y, ⌘)   ⌘0. For x 2 X and y 2 Y, introduce
Uxy = inf
"
{u˜ (x, ")  "y} and Vxy = inf
⌘
{v˜ (y, ⌘)  ⌘x} ,
so that u˜ (x, ") = maxy2Y {Uxy + "y, "0} and v˜ (y, ⌘) = maxx2X
 





maxy2Y {Uxy + "y, "0} dn˜ (x, ")+
R
maxx2X {Vxy + ⌘x, ⌘0} dm˜ (y, ⌘) over U and
V subject to constraints Uxy + Vxy    xy. Assign non-negative multipliers µxy to these





























maxy2Y {Uxy + "y, "0} dn˜ (x, ") =
P
x nxEPx [maxy2Y Uxy+ "y, "0] = nxGx(Ux·),
where EPx denotes the expectation over the population of men in group x, and where we
have used Assumption 1. Adding the similar expression for women, we get that W is the
maximum over µ   0 ofPx2X ,y2Y µxy xy A (µ) B (µ), whereA (µ) = max(Uxy){Px2X ,y2Y µxyUxy P
x2X nxGx(Ux·)}, and B has a similar expression involving H and m instead of G and n.
Now consider the term with first subscript x inA(µ). They sum up to nx(
P
y2Y µy|xUxy 
Gx(Ux·)), which is nx times the Legendre transform of G evaluated at µ·|x. We can there-




















Expression (2.9) follows. Convexity of W w.r.t.   is a an immediate consequence of
the latter expression, while concavity of W w.r.t. (n,m) is immediately deduced from
Expression (2.10). Points (ii), (iii) and (iv) are then deduced immediately.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
If Assumption 4 holds for Px, then the function Gx is increasing in each of its arguments;
since its derivatives are the probabilities µy|x at the optimum, they must be positive. More-
over, G⇤x(µ·|x) would be infinite if
P
y µy|x were to equal one; and that is not compatible
with optimality. We can therefore neglect the feasibility constraints (2.9). By the first





(µ·|x) which is (2.12). The envelope theorem in the same program





summation and using the fact that  xy = Uxy + Vxy, yields (2.13), proving (ii).
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
The result follows from the fact that Uxy = ↵xy+⌧xy and Vxy =  xy ⌧xy; thus if Uxy and Vxy
are identified and ⌧xy is observed, then ↵ and   are identified by ↵xy = Uxy ⌧xy and  xy =
Vxy + ⌧xy.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3

























 kxy + E (µ) ;
therefore µ minimizes E over the set of µ 2M such that Px,y  µˆxy   µxy  kxy = 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Since µ ˆ maximizes W when   =  ˆ, Px,y µˆxy  ˆxy   E (µˆ)  Px,y µ ˆxy  ˆxy   E ⇣µ ˆ⌘, and,











xy holds by construction; hence E (µˆ)   E(µ ˆ) with equality if
and only if µ ˆ = µˆ.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof uses results in Bauschke and Borwein (1997), which builds on Csiszar (1975). The
map µ! E(µ) is essentially smooth and essentially strictly convex; hence it is a “Legendre
function” in their terminology. Introduce the associated “Bregman divergence” D as
D (µ; ⌫) = E (µ)  E (⌫)  hrE (⌫) ,µ  ⌫i ,
and introduce the linear subspaces M (n) and M (m) by
M (n) = {µ   0 : 8x 2 X ,
X
y2Y0




so that M(n,m) = M (n) \M (m). It is easy to see that µ(k) results from iterative
projections with respect to D on the linear subspaces M(n) and on M(m):













By Theorem 8.4 of Bauschke and Borwein, the iterated projection algorithm converges19
to the projection µ of µ(0) on M(n,m), which is also the maximizer µ of (2.9).
B Explicit examples
The Generalized Extreme Values Framework
Consider a family of functions gx : IR
|Y0| ! IR that (i) are positive homogeneous of degree
one; (ii) go to +1 whenever any of their arguments goes to +1; (iii) are such that their
partial derivatives (outside of 0) at any order k have sign ( 1)k; (iv) are such that the
19In the notation of their Theorem 8.4, the hyperplanes (Ci) are M(p) and M(q); and the Breg-
man/Legendre function f is our  .
50
functions defined by F (w0, ..., wJ) = exp ( gx (e w0 , ..., e wJ )) are multivariate cumulative
distribution functions, associated to a distribution which we denote Px. Then introducing







= log gx (e
w) +   (B.1)












, where for x 2 X , the vector wx (p) is a solution






for y 2 Y0. Hence, the part of the













where C =  
P
x2X nx. The derivative of this expression with respect to µxy (x, y   1) is
 wxy (µ/n).
B.1 Ex. 1: The Choo-Siow model
Claims of Section 3.1. With centered standard type I extreme value iid distributions
G(  , 1), the expected utility is Gx(Ux·) = log(1 +
P
y2Y exp(Uxy)), and the maximum in












1A = µ0|x log(µ0|x) +X
y2Y
µy|x logµy|x
which gives equation (3.3). Equation (3.4) obtains by straightforward di↵erentiation.




























xy  W ( ) ,
which establishes (4.5). Now by the envelope theorem, @W/@  = Px,y µ xy@  xy/@  since







B.2 Ex. 2: The RUSC model
Claims of Section 3.1. From Proposition 2, G⇤x(µ·|x) =  max⇡2Mx E⇡ [⇣x(Y )"], where
⇡ has margins F" and µ(Y |x = x). Since the function (", ⇣)  ! "⇣ is supermodular, the
optimal matching must be positively assortative: larger "’s must be matched with y’s with
larger values of the index ⇣x(y). For each x, the values of ⇣x(y) are distinct and we let
⇣(1) < . . . < ⇣(|Y|+1) denote the ordered values of distinct values of ⇣x(y) for y 2 Y0; the
value ⇣(k) occurs with probability




By positive assortative matching, there exists a sequence "(0) = inf " < "(1) < . . . < "(|Y|) <
"(|Y|+1) = sup " such that "matches with a y with ⇣x(y) = ⇣(k) if and only if " 2 ["(k 1), "(k)];





















"f (") d" =
 
F ("(k))  F ("(k 1))
 
e¯k, with e¯k defined as the conditional mean










y µxy e¯K(y), with K(y) the value of k such that ⇣x(y) = ⇣(k); in the main text we use the
notation e¯x(y) = e¯K(y).











("(k) + "(k 1))/2, we obtain
E
⇥




















Sxyy0 = max(⇣x(y), ⇣x(y
0)).
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Therefore, using µ0|x = 1 
P












(Sxy0   Sx00)µy|x + Sx00
1A .




0y0 Sxyy0 Sx00 and  xy = Sx00 Sxy0;
this gives G⇤x(µ·|x) = 12
⇣
µ0·|xT


































leads to E (µ) = (µ0Aµ+ 2B0µ+ c)/2, where µ is the vector of µxy for x 2 X and y 2 Y.








where  .µ is the vector product
P
xy µxy xy. Hence, if µ is interior, i.e. if there are no
empty cells, the solution is given by µ = A 1 (  B) and W = 12((  B)0A 1 (  B) 
c), where the invertibility of A follows from the fact that for each x, the values of ⇣x(y),
y 2 Y0 have been assumed to be distinct. One has @A 1/@nx =  A 1(@A/@nx)A 1 and
@A/@nx =  Mx/n2x, where
Mxx0y,x00y0 = 1
 
x = x0 = x00
 
T xyy0 (B.6)











































and it is recalled that the expression for Mx is given in (B.6). Finally (C.5) yields
@µxy
@ x0y0
= A 1xy,x0y0 . (B.11)
Claims of Section 4.2. Assume that the data generating process is the RUSC model
of Example 2, where we fix ⇣xand ⇠y, and where  
  is linearly parameterized as in (4.2).
Assume further that all µ’s are positive. Then
W ( ) = 1
2
 






is reshaped as a matrix. As a consequence, the Moment Matching










B.3 Ex. 3: The nested logit model
For concreteness, we develop a very simple two-level nested logit model, but generalizations
are immediate.
Example 3 (A two-level nested logit model). Suppose for instance that men of a given
group x are concerned about the social group of their partner and her education, so that
y = (s, e). We can allow for correlated preferences by modeling this as a nested logit in
which educations are nested within social groups. Let Px have cdf









This is a particular case of the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) framework described in








. The numbers 1/ s
describe the correlation in the surplus generated with partners of di↵erent education levels
within social group s
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Identifying Utilities and Surplus. For simplicity, we center the type I extreme value
distributions. Consider a man of a group x (the x indices will be dropped for convenience,
so that for instance µs denotes the number of matches with women in social group s). By
(B.1), the expected utility of this man is







hence, by (2.2), it follows that µse/µ0 = (
P
e e
Use/ s) s 1eUse/ s , where µ0 is again defined
in (3.1). Thus log(µs/µ0) =  s log(
P
e exp(Use/ s)), and therefore Use = log(µs/µ0) +












= µ0 logµ0 +
X
s




As in Example 1, the expected utility is u =   logµ0.
If the heterogeneity structure is the same for all men and all women (with possibly
di↵erent dispersion parameters   for men and ⌧ for women), then the expressions of E(µ)
and W(µ) can easily be obtained. Now if the nested logit applies for men of group x with
parameters ( xs0) and for women of group y with parameters (⌧
y
s), we can write Ux,s0e0 =
log(µx,s0/µx0) +  
x
s0 log(µx,s0e0/µx,s0) and Vse,y = log(µs,y/µ0y) + ⌧
y
s log(µse,y/µs,y). Adding
up gives the formula for the surplus from a match between a man of group x = (s, e) and















Note that we recover the results of Example 1 when all   parameters equal 1; also, if there
is only one possible social status, then we recover the heteroskedastic model.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. In the Nested Logit model of Example 3, where
the group of men and women are respectively (sx, ex) and (sy, ey), one can take  sxexsy
and  
sy ,ey
sx as parameters. Assume that there are Ns social categories and Ne classes of
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education. There are N2s ⇥ N2e equations, so one can parameterize the surplus function

























, 8x 2 X , y 2 Y
and the log-likelihood can be deduced by (4.1).
Computing the Equilibrium. Consider the Nested Logit model of Example 3, and
assume for simplicity that there is only one social group, so the model boils down to a
heteroskedastic logit model with scale parameters  x and ⌧y. Recall the equilibrium formula










At step 2k + 1, keep µ0y fixed, and look for µx0 such that













while at step 2k + 2, keep µx0 fixed and look for µ0y such that













Note that steps (B.14) and (B.15) only require inverting a continuous and increasing real
function of one variable, and are hence extremely cheap computationally. This idea can be
extended to the fully general nested logit at the cost of having to invert systems of equations
whose number of variables depends on the size of the nests.
B.4 The mixture of logits model
Our next example considers a more complex but richer specification, which approximates
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneities through a mixture of logits whose location,
scale and weights may depend on the observed group:
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Example 4 (A mixture of logits). Assume Px is a mixture of i.i.d. centered type I extreme






k = 1. Then
the ex-ante indirect utility of man of group x is the weighted sum of the corresponding ex-

























y2Y0 µy logµy. By standard results in
Convex Analysis (see e.g. Rockafellar 1970, section 20), the convex conjugate of a sum of
functions is the infimum-convolution of the conjugates of the functions in the sum. The


































is the minimizer of (B.17).
C Comparative statics
The results of Theorem 1 can be used to show that the comparative statics results of Decker
et al. (2012) extend to our generalized framework. From the results of Section 2.3, recall
that W ( ,n,m) is given by the dual expressions




µxy xy   E (µ)
!
, and (C.1)








As a result, note that by (C.1), W is a convex function of  , and by (C.2) it is a concave






= Gx (Uxy) = ux, and
@W
@my
= Hy (Vxy) = vy.
57










(and similarly @ux/@my = @vy/@nx and @vy/@my0 = @vy0/@my), which is the “unexpected
symmetry” result proven by Decker et al. (2012), Theorem 2, for the multinomial logit Choo
and Siow model: the variation in the systematic part of the surplus of individual of group
x when the number of individuals of group x0 varies by one unit equals the variation in the
systematic part of the surplus of individual of group x0 when the number of individuals of
group x varies by one unit. Formula (C.3) shows that the result is valid quite generally
in the framework of the present paper. The fact that W is a concave function of (n,m)
implies that the matrix @ux/@nx0 is semidefinite negative; in particular, it implies that
@ux/@nx  0, which means that increasing the number of individuals of a given group
cannot increase the individual welfare of individuals of this group.










which is proven (again in the case of the multinomial logit Choo and Siow model) in Decker
et al. (2012), section 3. This means that the e↵ect of an increase in the matching surplus
between groups x and y on the surplus of individual of group x0 equals the e↵ect of the
number of individuals of group x0 on the number of matches between groups x and y. Let us
provide an interpretation for this result. Assume that groups x and y are men and women
with a PhD, and that x0 are men with a college degree. Suppose that @µxy/@nx0 < 0, so
that an increase in the number of men with a college degree causes the number of matches
between men and women with a PhD to decrease. This suggests that men with a college
degree or with a PhD are substitutes for women with a PhD. Hence, if there is an increase
in the matching surplus between men and women with a PhD, men with a college degree
will become less of a substitute for men with a PhD, and therefore their share of surplus
will decrease, hence @ux0/@ xy < 0.
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The interpretation is the following: if increasing the matching surplus between groups x and
y has a positive e↵ect on marriages between groups x0 and y0, then increasing the matching
surplus between groups x0 and y0 has a positive e↵ect on marriages between groups x and y.
In that case marriages (x, y) and (x0, y0) are complements. We emphasize here that all the
comparative statics derived in this section hold in any model satisfying our assumptions.
D Geometric interpretation
Our approach to inference has a simple geometric interpretation. Consider the set of como-










xy, µ 2M (nˆ, mˆ)
)
This is a convex polyhedron, which we call the covariogram; and if the model is well-
specified the covariogram must contain the observed matching µˆ. For any value of the
parameter vector  , the optimal matching µ  generates a vector of comoments C  that
belongs to the covariogram; and it also has an entropy E  ⌘ E(µ ). We already know that
this model is just-identified from the comoments: the mapping    ! C  is invertible on the
covariogram. Denote  (C) its inverse. The corresponding optimal matching has entropy
Er (C) = E (C). The level sets of Er (.) are the isoentropy curves in the covariogram;
they are represented on Figure 3. The figure assumes K = 2 dimensions; then   can be
represented in polar coordinates as   = r exp(it). For r = 0, the model is uninformative
and entropy is highest; the matching is random and generates comoments C0. At the
other extreme, the boundary @F of the covariogram corresponds to r = 1. Then there is
no unobserved heterogeneity and generically over t, the comoments generated by   must



















Figure 3: The covariogram and related objects
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the corresponding comoments follow a trajectory indicated by the dashed line on Figure 3,
from the boundary @F to the point C0. At the same time, the entropy E  increases, and
the trajectory crosses contours of higher entropy (E 0 then E 00 on the figure.) The CML
Estimator  ˆ could also be obtained by taking the normal to the isoentropy contour that
goes through the observed comoments Cˆk = Ck (µˆ), as shown on Figure 3. Indeed, the
estimator  ˆ
MM
of the parameter vector is given by the gradient of Er (.) at the point Cˆ,
that is @Er(Cˆ)/@Ck =  ˆMMk .
E Computational experiments
Equation (5.9) is a quadratic equation in only one unknown,
q
µ2k+1x0 ; as such it can be
solved in closed form.The convergence is extremely fast. We tested it on a simulation in
which we let the number of categories |X | = |Y| increase from 100 to 1,000. For each of
these ten cases, we draw 50 samples, with the nx and my drawn uniformly in {1, . . . , 100};
and for each (x, y) match we draw  xy from N (0, 1). To have a basis for comparison, we














which characterizes the optimal matching with µxy = exp( xy/2)
pµx0µ0y, µx0 = a2x, and
µ0y = b
2
y (see Decker et al. (2012)).
To solve system (E.1)–(E.2), we used both Minpack and Knitro. Minpack is probably
the most-used solver in scientific applications, and underlies many statistical and numerical
packages. Knitro20 is a constrained optimization software; but minimizing the function zero
under constraints that correspond to the equations one wants to solve has become popular
recently.
20See Byrd, Nocedal and Waltz (2006).
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For all three methods, we used C/C++ programs, run on a single processor of a Mac
desktop. We set the convergence criterion for the three methods as a relative estimated error
of 10 6. This is not as straightforward as one would like: both Knitro and Minpack rescale
the problem before solving it, while we did not attempt to do it for IPFP. Still, varying
the tolerance within reasonable bounds hardly changes the results, which we present in
Figure 4. Each panel gives the distribution of CPU times over 50 samples (20 for Knitro)
for the ten experiments, in the form of a Tukey box-and-whiskers graph21.
The performance of IPFP stands out clearly—note the di↵erent vertical scales. While
IPFP has more variability than Minpack and Knitro (perhaps because we did not rescale
the problem beforehand), even the slowest convergence times for each problem size are at
least three times smaller than the fastest sample under Minpack, and fifteen times smaller
than the fastest time with Knitro. This is all the more remarkable that we fed the code for
the Jacobian of the system of equations into Minpack, and for both the Jacobian and the
Hessian into Knitro.
21The box goes from the first to the third quartile; the horizontal bar is at the median; the lower (resp.
upper) whisker is at the first (resp. third) quartile minus (resp. plus) 1.5 times the interquartile range, and
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Figure 4: Solving for the optimal matching
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